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INTER-AMERICAN
HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
Cinco Pensionistas v. Pe ruand Juan Hu m b e rt o
Sánchez v. Ho n d u ra s a re among the first cases to
be decided by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (Court) under the new pro c e d u r-
al rules passed in 2001. Among the new rules is
a provision that allows the victims’ counsel to
allege violations of the American Convention on
Human Rights (Convention) in its complaint to
the Court that have not been alleged by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission). Pre v i o u s l y, the Court would only
hear evidence of violations alleged by the
C o m m i s s i o n .
In Cinco Pe n s i o n i s t a s , decided on Fe b ru a ry
28, 2003, the victims’ counsel exe rcised their
n ew right to allege a violation of the connve n t i o n
that was not alleged by the Commission.
Although the Court did not find the part i c u l a r
violation alleged, it is nonetheless significant that
the victims’ counsel was able to bring the claim
e ven though the Commission did not make a
c o n c u r rent allegation. A significant jurispru d e n-
tial development was the Court’s identification
of the right to a social service, in this case a pen-
sion, as a private pro p e rty right. A negative
d e velopment, howe ve r, was the Court’s decision
to narrowly interpret protections of economic,
social, and cultural rights under the Convention. 
In Juan Hu m b e rto Sánchez, decided on Ju n e
7, 2003, the Court heard the first case of forc e d
disappearance and extrajudicial exe c u t i o n
against Honduras since deciding Ve l a s q u ez
Rodriguez v. Ho n d u ra s in 1988. This is signifi-
cant in that the Court felt compelled to re i t e r a t e
what it had recommended to Honduras 15 ye a r s
ago re g a rding judicial reform and respect for
human rights. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, this case marks a sig-
nificant development in the interpretation of
violations of the right to life and clarifies the def-
inition of arbitrary and illegal detentions in its
discussion of the right to personal libert y.
CINCO PENSIONISTAS V. PERU
The victims in this case we re five Pe ruvian gov-
ernment employees whose pensions we re arbi-
trarily reduced in 1992. The five pensioners had
w o rked for a government agency for over twe n t y
years and we re guaranteed a pension at a leve l
stipulated by Pe ruvian domestic law. In 1992, the
g overnment significantly reduced their pensions.
The five pensioners brought their claim to
the Su p reme Court of Pe ru in 1994. T h e
Su p reme Court ord e red the government to
re s t o re their pensions. When the gove r n m e n t
failed to do so, they went before the
Constitutional Tribunal of Pe ru, which instru c t-
ed the government to comply with the Su p re m e
C o u rt ve rdict. The government again failed to
comply with this ord e r. 
In Fe b ru a ry 1998 the Human Rights
Program of the Labor Ad v i s o ry Center of Pe ru
(CEDAL) and the Association for Hu m a n
Rights (APRODEH), filed a petition with the
Commission alleging that the Pe ruvian gove r n-
ment had arbitrarily reduced the wages of the
f i ve pensioners. The Commission decided in
f a vor of the pensioners after a merits hearing and
b rought the case before the Court in De c e m b e r
2001. CEDAL and the Center for Justice and
International Law (CEJIL) acted jointly as the
p e n s i o n e r s’ counsel before the Court. To g e t h e r,
the Commission and the pensioners’ counsel
alleged that the Pe ruvian government violated
A rticles 21 (right to private pro p e rty), 25 (right
to judicial protection), and 26 (right to pro g re s-
s i ve development of economic, social, and cul-
tural rights) of the Convention. Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the
p e n s i o n e r s’ counsel exe rcised their right under
the 2001 procedural rules to make allegations
b e yond those made by the Commission and
independently alleged a violation of Article 8
(right to a fair trial). Although the Court did not
find sufficient evidence to substantiate the alle-
gation of an Article 8 violation, its ruling did
a c k n owledge the right of a victim’s counsel to
make allegations beyond those alleged by the
Commission before the Court. 
Both in complaints to the Court and in the
C o u rt’s decisions themselves, the rights to a fair
trial and to judicial protection (Articles 8 and
25) are generally discussed together. In this case,
h owe ve r, they we re considered separately, with
the Court finding an Article 25 violation, but
not an Article 8 violation. The Court found that
because the Pe ruvian government failed to com-
ply with the Su p reme Court’s decision to re s t o re
the pensions, Pe ru had violated the pensioners’
right to judicial protection. Subsection (2)(c) of
A rticle 25 re q u i res that the government ensure
the enforcement of remedies ord e red by the
C o u rt. In this case, the government failed to do
so by refusing to comply with the Su p re m e
C o u rt’s ru l i n g .
Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the Court found that the St a t e’s
a r b i t r a ry reduction of the pensions constituted a
violation of Article 21, the right to private pro p-
e rt y. The Court stated that, in accordance with
Pe ruvian domestic law, Article 21 protects the
right of the five pensioners to collect a pension
because it is an acquired right to pro p e rt y.
Tr a d i t i o n a l l y, private pro p e rty has been consid-
e red a tract of land or other tangible good. Yet in
this case, the Court elevates the status of a social
s e rvice from a privilege to a pro p e rty right that
cannot be limited or rescinded for any purpose
other than for reasons of public utility or social
i n t e rest. In this case, the reduction of the pen-
sions had no public utility and did not serve the
social interest.  
Fi n a l l y, the Court did not find that the pen-
sion reduction in this case was a violation of
A rticle 26, the right to pro g re s s i ve deve l o p m e n t
of economic, social, and cultural rights. In this
decision, the Court offers a narrow interpre t a-
tion of the Convention by holding that individ-
uals and small groups cannot successfully claim
relief under Article 26 and that violations of that
a rticle can only occur on the scale of society at
large. The Court did not consider the limited
experience of five pensioners to be re p re s e n t a t i ve
of Pe ruvian society as a whole. This narrow inter-
p retation will make it difficult to substantiate
A rticle 26 violations in future cases before the
C o u rt. 
In its decision on damages, the Court
o rd e red Pe ru to pay $3,000 to each pensioner
plus litigation costs for violations of Articles 21
and 25.
JUAN HUMBERTO SÁNCHEZ V.
HONDURAS
Juan Hu m b e rto Sánchez was arbitrarily
detained by the Honduran military for his
alleged connection with the Farabundo Ma rt í
National Liberation Front (FMLN), a
Sa l vadoran guerrilla movement. Sánchez was ini-
tially detained on July 10, 1992 and released the
f o l l owing day for lack of evidence. He was then
re - c a p t u red by military agents the night of his
release while in his home. His corpse was found
with signs of tort u re on July 21, 1992. 
In October 1992, the Commission for the
Defense of Human Rights in Central America
(CODEHUCA) filed a petition with the
Commission on behalf of Sánchez and his next
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of kin. The Commission decided in favor of the
victims after a merits hearing and brought the
case before the Court in September 2001.
C O D E H UACA and CEJIL acted jointly as the
v i c t i m s’ counsel before the Court .
Both the victims’ counsel and the
Commission alleged that Honduras had violated
s e veral articles of the Convention, including
A rticles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to personal
integrity), 7 (right to personal liberty), 8 (right to
a fair trial), and 25 (right to judicial pro t e c t i o n ) .
The Court found that Honduras had violated all
of the aforementioned articles of the
C o n vention. 
The Court found that Honduras violated
A rticle 4 when Honduran military personnel
extrajudicially executed Sánchez. In its decision,
the Court expanded the notion of state re s p o n s i-
bility for cases involving extrajudicial exe c u t i o n s .
It held that a state can be liable for extrajudicial
e xecution not only through act or omission, but
also by failing to pre vent such an act from occur-
ring. The Court held that the State not only has
a negative obligation to refrain from arbitrarily
depriving a person of his or her life, but has a
p o s i t i ve obligation to take the necessary steps to
p rotect and pre s e rve the right to life. The St a t e
must uphold this positive obligation thro u g h
p re vention and punishment, especially in the
case of its own security forces. The Court framed
this execution as part of a larger pattern of extra-
judicial execution tolerated, and even driven, by
the St a t e .
The Court held that Honduras violated
S á n c h ez’s right to personal liberty through his
a r b i t r a ry detention, a violation of Article 7. It
found that the conditions of Sánchez’s detention
did not conform to the standards re q u i red by
A rticle 7. Sánchez was detained by military
agents, rather than police; he was detained at
night in his family’s home; he was not immedi-
ately put before a judge; and neither he nor his
family we re informed of the reason for his deten-
tion as re q u i red under the Convention. 
In addition, the Court held that the St a t e
violated the personal integrity of both Sánchez
and his family members. By torturing Sánchez ,
the State violated his physical integrity. The St a t e
violated Sánchez’s family’s psychological and
moral integrity by treating Sánchez inhumanely
and executing him. A person’s physical, psyc h o-
logical, and moral integrity are all protected by
A rticle 5.
Fi n a l l y, the Court held that Honduras had
violated Articles 8 and 25, the rights to a fair trial
and judicial protection. Because of the nature of
his illegal and arbitrary detention, Sánchez was
unable to access the judicial system, determine
the reasons for his arrest, seek legal counsel, or
defend himself in front of competent authorities.
The investigation of his execution was ineffec-
t i ve, resulting in the failure to identify and sanc-
tion those responsible. The Court found this
case to be re p re s e n t a t i ve of a larger pattern of
weak judicial protection in Honduras, with its
high rate of impunity, lack of judicial re s o u rc e s ,
and ineffective investigations of extrajudicial exe-
cutions. 
In its decision on damages, the Court
o rd e red Honduras to pay $39,700 to Sánchez’s
family for material damages and $245,000 for
immaterial damages.
AFRICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
The African Commission on Human & Pe o p l e s’
Rights (Commission) came into force in 1986
after the Organization of African Union, now
the African Union, adopted the African Chart e r
on Human and Pe o p l e s’ Rights. Since its incep-
tion, the Commission’s mandate has been to
e n s u re the promotion and protection of human
rights throughout the African region. The 33rd
Ord i n a ry Session occurred earlier this year in
Ma y. The 34th Ord i n a ry Session, originally
planned to take place in Oc t o b e r, was re s c h e d-




During May 15-29, 2003, the 33rd Ord i n a ry
Session of the Commission was held in Ni a m e y,
Republic of Ni g e r.  The Commission addre s s e d
s e veral issues of note and adopted the Di re c t i ve s
and Principles on the Right to a Fair Trial and
Legal Aid in Africa. Fu rt h e r, the Commission
c o n s i d e red how it could find sufficient human
and financial support, as well as a suitable head-
q u a rters in order to increase its monitoring capa-
bilities and strengthen its efficacy.
The Commission continued to encourage
the establishment of national institutions of
human rights by states that have not yet estab-
lished them. The Commission outlined the
mandate for such institutions and urged the
countries that do not yet have them in place to
establish national institutions of human rights.
The Commission also continued to state its
determination to strengthen collaboration
b e t ween these institutions and the Commission.  
Debate among non-governmental and inter-
national organizations continues on the effec-
t i veness and the wisdom of establishing national
institutions of human rights.  Se veral states have
established such commissions, but failed to pro-
vide sufficient amounts of funding and/or
appointed directors lacking prior experience in
the field of human rights. This has cre a t e d
dependent institutions rather than institutions
that independently oversee government action.
Yet, some human rights groups feel that the
establishment of the institutions is a sign that
African governments, including some of the
most re p re s s i ve, are accepting the international
human rights discourse and acknowledging that
human rights protections should be a part of
their government port f o l i o.
Human rights organizations also argue that
national institutions, often without hesitation,
a re subjected to the whims of the gove r n m e n t
body and used as a smokescreen to hide gove r n-
ment human rights abuses. Fu rt h e r, the national
human rights institutions may actually under-
mine the work of the non-governmental organi-
zation (NGO) human rights community either
by denouncing their findings or by re m a i n i n g
strategically silent on attacks of human rights
defenders.  
Even so, the Commission views the national
institutions as bodies that strengthen the cooper-
ation between the states’ governments and the
Commission. The Commission believes that
institutions provide a liaison between itself and
the individual government through which
g reater transparency and accountability is
a c h i e ved. A re p o rt by Human Rights Wa t c h
o f f e red hope in stating “the Ghanaian, So u t h
African, and Ugandan [institutions] – a testa-
ment to the integrity of those [institutions’ ]
members – appear to be the most promising in
their willingness to actively speak out stro n g l y
against government abuses and to exhibit their
independence in the interest of protecting the
rights of their citizens. Although it is still early,
the Malawian and Senegalese [institutions] also
s h ow pro m i s e . ”
THE 34TH ORDINARY SESSION:
REPORT ON ZIMBABWE AND THE
AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
During the 34th Ord i n a ry Session, the
Commission intends to address and adopt the
draft re p o rt on the fact-finding mission to
Zi m b a bwe. Other countries such as Cote
d’ Ivo i re, the Se ychelles, Ni g e r, Djibouti, Su d a n ,
Angola, Libya, Cameroon, Benin and the
Democratic Republic of Congo will come under
the scrutiny of the Commission in the form of a
variety of re p o rts brought before it for adoption.
The Commission is also to address many of the
s u b s t a n t i ve issues in the implementation of the
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c h a rt e r, as is its custom. The Commission
intends to address the proposed African Court
on Human and Pe o p l e s’ Rights (Court) and cre-
ate strategies for the ratification of the Pro t o c o l
to create such a court in those countries that
h a ve not yet done so. In addition, the
Commission plans to discuss the situation of
human rights defenders, indigenous populations
and communities, refugees and displaced per-
sons, and the human rights situation in Africa
g e n e r a l l y.  
Though recent human rights abuses in
Zi m b a bwe will not likely be in the
Commission's draft re p o rt arising from its fact-
finding mission (scheduled for presentation in
November of 2003), the draft re p o rt will likely
condemn the further bre a k d own of the rule of
law in Zi m b a bwe. For example, the re p o rt will
likely discuss increasing government controls on
independent media within the country. On
September 11, 2003 the Daily News of
Zi m b a bwe, the only independent newspaper in
Zi m b a bwe, was declared to be operating illegally
by the Su p reme Court of Zi m b a bwe. The fol-
l owing day, September 12, 2003, the police raid-
ed the offices of the newspaper and seized their
computer equipment.  
The Daily Ne w s was found in violation of the
Access to Information and Protection of Pr i va c y
Act (AIPPA), a law put in place by Pre s i d e n t
Ro b e rt Mugabe that re q u i res the registration of
all media groups and journalists with the gove r n-
m e n t’s Media and Information Commission
(MIC) and authorizes the operation of media
g roups and journalists only with the MIC’s
a p p roval. As of September 28, 2003, 9 journal-
ists we re charged with violating Section 83, gov-
erning the license re q u i rement of the AIPPA ,
and it was expected that fort y - f i ve additional
Daily Ne w s journalists would also be charged.
The journalists we re charged with assisting in the
p roduction of an illegal new s p a p e r. 
In response, the Daily Ne w s challenged the
constitutionality of the registration re q u i re m e n t ,
but the challenge was unsuccessful. The Da i l y
Ne w s journalists who we re charged with violat-
ing Section 83 of the AIPPA had applied for
a c c reditation but their applications we re not for-
w a rded through the MIC because of the consti-
tutional challenge made by the Daily Ne w s. As a
result, the Daily Ne w s filed applications with the
Zi m b a bwean courts seeking an ove rturn of the
M I C ’s decision to deny it a license and filed suit
seeking the return of their computer equipment. 
Though the Commission itself did not
d i rectly address the matter of establishing the
African Court on Human and Pe o p l e s’ Rights, a
s u b s i d i a ry conference occurred during the 33rd
Ord i n a ry Session. The Conference for We s t
African States on the Protocol for the
Establishment of the African Court on Hu m a n
and Pe o p l e s’ Rights (Conference) met in
Ni a m e y, Niger on May 28-29, 2003. During the
C o n f e rence, the attendees sought the
C o m m i s s i o n’s approval of the Protocol to estab-
lish the African Court on Human and Pe o p l e s’
Rights (Protocol). Senior re p re s e n t a t i ves from 12
West African countries along with observer par-
ticipants of additional countries attended the
c o n f e rence. 
The Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Pe o p l e s’ Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Hu m a n
and Pe o p l e s’ Rights (Protocol) states that “[it]
shall come into force thirty days after fifteen
i n s t ruments of ratification or accession have
been deposited.” At the time of the Confere n c e
in Ma y, 9 states had ratified the Protocol, 3 states
we re in the advanced stages of ratification, and 1
state was in the beginning stages of ratification.
The Conference proceeded to address the con-
straints and obstacles to the ratification of the
Protocol, as well as strategies to ensure early rat-
ification of the Protocol by all West African
c o u n t r i e s .
The Conference also established the
Coalition on the African Court on Human and
Pe o p l e s’ Rights (Coalition), a group comprised
of national human rights institutions as well as
national and international non-gove r n m e n t a l
organizations. The Coalition’s mandate granted
it the power to facilitate full ratification of the
Protocol together with the De c l a r a t i o n
Accepting non-State Access to the Court under
A rticle 34(6) of the Protocol by all West African
states before October 21, 2003. In addition, the
Coalition was asked to work to re a l i ze the widest
possible ratification of the Protocol and to ensure
an early establishment of the Court .
Ad d i t i o n a l l y, the Coalition was given the task of
establishing a liaison with the Commission of
the African Union and the Commission with the
purpose of ensuring the effective participation of
African Civil Society in resolving practical issues
associated with the establishment of an effective
C o u rt, such as the location of the headquart e r s ,
the election of judges, the establishment of the
Re g i s t ry of the Court, Rules of Pro c e d u re and
the funding and complementarities between the
C o u rt and the Commission.
European Commission on Human
Rights
The Case of Ernst and Others v. Be l g i u m
On July 15, 2003, the Eu ropean Court of
Human Rights (Court) unanimously held in
Ernest and Others v. Be l g i u m that inve s t i g a t i ve
m e a s u res taken by Belgian authorities violated
f reedom of expression and respect of private life
under Articles 10 and 8 of the Eu ro p e a n
C o n vention on Human Rights (Convention). 
The four applicants are Belgian journalists
and their complaint stems from searches of their
offices and homes and from the seizure of docu-
ments carried out by Belgian authorities in 1995.
At the time, information surrounding cert a i n
high profile criminal cases was leaked to mem-
bers of the media. The investigating judge head-
ing the prosecution for breach of confidence
o rd e red the Serious Crimes Squad to conduct
s e a rches of the offices, homes, and two ve h i c l e s
belonging to the applicants. In the course of the
s e a rches, the Crime Squad seized documents,
computer disks and the hard drives of the appli-
c a n t s’ computers. The length of these searc h e s
varied between a half hour and three hours. T h e
applicants we re neither informed of the re a s o n s
for the search, nor we re they notified that it was
to occur. The applicants we re not named as civil
p a rties in the criminal inve s t i g a t i o n .
In September 1995, the applicants lodged a
complaint with the investigating judge of the
Brussels Court of First Instance. Because the case
was directed against a sitting judge, the case was
t r a n s f e r red to the pro s e c u t o r’s office, the
Minister of Justice, and finally to the Court of
Cassation. The Court of Cassation found the
complaint inadmissible because it exceeded the
jurisdiction of the Court, and the applicants
we re informed that the Court would take no fur-
ther action in their case.
Having exhausted their domestic re m e d i e s ,
the applicants lodged a complaint with the
Eu ropean Commission of Human Rights
(Commission) in September 1996. When the
case was transferred to the Court in Nove m b e r
1998, the applicants asserted that the
Gove r n m e n t’s action interf e red with their fre e-
dom of expression in breach of Article 10 of the
C o n vention, violated their right to respect for
p r i vate life guaranteed by Article 8, discriminat-
ed against them under Articles 14 and 6, and
constituted a failure of effective remedy under
A rticle 13. They pre vailed on claims under
A rticle 10 and 8. 
A rticle 10 of the Convention guarantees fre e-
dom of expression subject to the state’s right to
implement legitimate measures under domestic
law that are necessary in a democratic society to
s a f e g u a rd the public. When the press is invo l ve d ,
the Court balances the interests of society in
maintaining the liberty of the press with the
goals of the state. In addition, the Court main-
tains that any measures impeding freedom of
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e x p ression must be reasonably pro p o rtionate to
legitimate aims. The Court applied a thre e - p a rt
test. First, the law must provide for the measure
in question. Second, the goal of the measure
must be legitimate. T h i rd, there must be a satis-
f a c t o ry relationship between the measure and the
goals of the state.
In this case, the Court found the law prov i d-
ed for the measure. Second, the Court found
that the reason for the interf e rence in question
was primarily aimed at protecting the re p u t a t i o n
of others and maintaining the authority and
i m p a rtiality of the judiciary. Fi n a l l y, in light of
the extensive nature of the searches, the Court
held that the Government had not demonstrat-
ed that the search and seizure pro c e d u re was nec-
e s s a ry to determine whether the applicants we re
p a rties to the offenses under investigation. T h u s ,
the Court found a violation of Article 10 and
turned to the applicants’ allegations under
A rticle 8.
A rticle 8 protects an individual’s right to
respect for private life from state infringement.
State administered measures that infringe upon
an individual’s right to respect for private life
must be provided for by the law and pro p o rt i o n-
ate to a legitimate state aim. Thus, any interf e r-
ence with an Article 8 right must be narrow l y
t a i l o red to legitimate goals. 
In this case, the Court found the measure
was proscribed by the law and satisfied the first
re q u i rement. The Court also found the
Government was pursuing legitimate state aims
of pre venting crime and protecting the rights
and freedoms of others. Howe ve r, the Court
found that the procedural safeguards employe d
by Belgian authorities while conducting the
s e a rches and seizures we re not executed in a
manner pro p o rtionate to the legitimate aims
pursued. The applicants had been neither
accused of any offense nor had they been
informed of the reasons for the searches. T h e
s e a rch warrants we re also drafted in overly bro a d
terms, allowing for the seizure of any document
or object that might further the inve s t i g a t i o n .
T h e re f o re, the Court found a violation of Art i c l e
8 and ord e red Belgium to pay each applicant two
thousand euros for moral damages and nine
thousand euros for the applicants’ fees and
expenses. 
The Case of Karner v. Austria
In the case of K a rner v. Au s t r i a, decided on
July 24, 2003, the Court found that an Au s t r i a n
tenancy law was discriminatory on the basis of
sexual orientation and in violation of Articles 14
and 8 of the Convention. 
Karner was an Austrian national who lived in
an apartment leased by his homosexual part n e r.
In 1991, his partner was diagnosed with HIV
and designated Mr. Karner his heir before his
death in 1994. In 1995, the landlord of the
a p a rtment instituted proceedings against Mr.
Karner in order to terminate his tenancy. Both
the District Court and the Regional Court
a g reed with Mr. Karner and held that under the
Rent Act (the statute in question), the right to
succession of a tenancy equally applied to homo-
sexual partners as well as to heterosexual couples.
Howe ve r, on appeal, the Austrian Su p re m e
C o u rt re versed the judgment and terminated
M r. Karner’s lease. The Su p reme Court held that
the statutory language of “life companion” had
to be interpreted at the time of the enactment of
Rent Act of 1974, and that the legislature’s inten-
tion was to pre s e rve the traditional family and
e xclude same-sex couples. 
In 1997, Mr. Karner lodged a complaint
with Eu ropean Commission of Human Rights.
He alleged that the Su p reme Court’s decision
not to re c o g n i ze his right to succeed the tenancy
constituted discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in violation of Article 14 of the
C o n vention read in conjunction with Article 8.
Be f o re the case was found admissible, Mr.
Karner passed away and his mother waived her
right to succeed to the estate. Mr. Karner’s lawye r
asked the Court not to strike the application
until other heirs to Mr. Karner’s estate we re iden-
tified. When no heirs we re identified, the
Austrian Government requested the application
be struck from the list of cases because no one
intended to pursue Mr. Karner’s application. 
Although no heirs came forw a rd, Mr.
K a r n e r’s complaint was declared partly admissi-
ble. In many similar cases, the Court deferred to
the applicant’s heirs or close family. Because the
goal of the Convention system lies in individual
re l i e f, the Court only strikes applications that
lack an individual wish to pursue pro c e e d i n g s .
Howe ve r, the Court also hears applications on
public policy grounds. In this case, the Court
c o n s i d e red the differential treatment of homo-
sexuals  in relation to the succession of tenancies
under Austrian law an important question of
i n t e rest for both Austria and for other Me m b e r
States to the Convention. The Court noted that
continued examination of Mr. Karner’s case
would “elucidate, safeguard and develop the
s t a n d a rds of protection under the Conve n t i o n . ”
Judge Gr a b e n w a rt e r, alone in his dissent,
stated that although combating discrimination
against homosexuals is an important human
rights concern, it does not justify continued
examination of a case after the applicant’s death.
He highlighted that under Article 37 of the
C o n vention, the Court may decide, at any time
in the proceeding, to strike an application if cir-
cumstances indicate that the applicant will not
pursue the application. He argued that the
C o u rt had taken a significant misstep in its
j u r i s p rudence by not striking down the case. 
The Court decided to continue the examina-
tion of the case, affirming that the subject mat-
ter of the application was properly squared with
A rticle 8, paragraph 1, treating elements of pri-
vate life, family, and home. In addition, the
C o u rt held that but for his sexual orientation,
M r. Karner could have been accepted as a life
companion entitled to succession of his part n e r’s
lease, and thus, Article 14 was applicable. In its
decision, the Court highlighted the principle of
p ro p o rt i o n a l i t y, which provides that differe n t i a l
t reatment is discriminatory if it does not pursue
a legitimate aim or if the means employed are
d i s p ro p o rtionate to the aim sought. Pa rt i c u l a r l y
serious reasons are necessary to justify differe n t i a l
t reatment based on sexual orientation. 
The Court accepted the theoretical justifica-
tion for differential treatment given by the
Government that the statutory provision aimed
to protect the traditional family unit. But in
keeping with the principle of pro p o rt i o n a l i t y, the
C o u rt deemed the aim too abstract and not nar-
rowly tailored. The Government was re q u i red to
demonstrate that the exclusion of homosexual
couples from the scope of the legislation was nec-
e s s a ry to protect the traditional family unit.
Because the Government did not offer argu-
ments to support this conclusion, it did not jus-
tify the interpretation of the statutory prov i s i o n
within its limited 1974 context. T h e re f o re, the
C o u rt found a violation of Article 14 in conjunc-
tion with Article 8.  H R B
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